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Abstract
A crucial aspect of debt restructuring is the redistribution of value among many
diverse interests, differing in priority, collateral and bargaining power. Focusing
on renegotiable debt contracts in a continuous-time framework, we characterise the
U.S corporate bankruptcy renegotiation (Chapter 11) in a game-theoretic frame-
work. In formal bankruptcy, the equity holders can renegotiate with one creditor at
a time. Unlike previous studies, this allows us to endogenise not only the bankruptcy
threshold but also the impairment strategy. Moreover, our game-theoretic setting
allows us to explicitly introduce and accommodate varying bargaining powers of
claimants. First, we show that there exists a unique sequence of equilibrium re-
structuring plans and impairment strategies which allows us to derive simple and
intuitive closed-form solutions for pricing different classes of debt. Secondly, the
model provides a theoretical explanation for cases of seniority reversal. Thirdly, we
derive sufficient conditions for the senior credit spread to be smaller than the junior
one at all levels of the state variable.
∗Comments are welcome. We are very grateful to Giovanni Barone-Adesi, John Brierley, William
Perraudin and Ron Smith for helpful suggestions and discussions. School of Economics, Mathemat-
ics and Statistics, Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet Street, London, UK; e-mails: abrec-
cia@econ.bbk.ac.uk; fax: +44 (0)20 7631 6416.
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Introduction
This paper examines the role of priority on corporate renegotiable debt under the U.S.
bankruptcy code (Chapter 11). Unlike previous literature on renegotiable debt, we en-
dogenise not only the bankruptcy threshold, but also the order in which classes of debt
(with different level of priority) are restructured. In fact, according to Chapter 11, some
classes of debtholders can be excluded from the renegotiating table as long as they receive
the promised contractual payments, that is, such classes are left “unimpaired”. Interest-
ingly, we recognise that this aspect of Chapter 11, well known to legal scholars, largely
enhances the set of strategic actions available to the equity holders. The equity holders
must choose the threshold level to default as well as the class/classes of creditors to im-
pair. Therefore, in this paper, bankruptcy threshold and impairment strategy are jointly
and endogenously determined.
In contrast to previous studies on strategic default, introducing impairment strategies
allows us to capture absolute priority reversals not just amongst debt and equity, but also
among different layers of debt. In fact, we show that what makes the actual debt priority
structure is the optimal impairment strategy, which is uniquely defined by the value of
collateral, bargaining power and face value of each class of debt. This result is in line
with Rajan and Winton (1995), who argue that collateral makes the effective priority of
debt1.
Most important, we show that absolute priority violation amongst senior and junior
debtholders can lead to reversal in the credit spreads. Moreover, for spread reversals not
to occur we provide a simple and intuitive sufficient condition expressed in terms of face
values, collateral and bargaining powers of creditors. Therefore the strategic impairment
characterised in our setting is of great relevance when pricing different classes of debt.
Focusing on renegotiable debt contracts, within a continuous-time pricing framework,
we formalise the bankruptcy system as a judicially supervised bargaining process between
the claimants and the equity holders. Our game-theoretic framework can be compared
with Brown (1989), firstly in that our set of bankruptcy rules captures the main features
of Chapter 11. Secondly, we both stress the importance of those rules which give the
equity holders the option to renegotiate with one creditor at a time 2 in a sort of ‘private
renegotiation’. Briefly, a Chapter 11 filing triggers two essential rules: i) the equity
1In particular, they focus on bank loans, typically highly secured and containing seniority clauses.
2Such as the equity holders’ exclusivity period and the impairment rules allocating veto power in
renegotiation. See below.
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holders have the exclusive right to file a first restructuring plan3 and ii) those claimholders
left unimpaired by a plan4 lose their veto power. Therefore, in formal bankruptcy, the
equity holders have the option to renegotiate with one creditor at a time in a sort of
‘private renegotiation’ while excluding unimpaired creditors from the negotiating table.
This possibility is widely exploited in reality, and it largely enhances the equity holders’
strategic behaviour in bankruptcy. It is actually rare the case where a debtor files a
Chapter 11 plan which impairs all claims at once. Quite commonly, a restructuring plan
leaves a certain number of classes unimpaired (most typically, the secured senior classes)
and impairs all or some unsecured classes. In Table A, we report the classification of
claims, the impairment of classes and the solicitation of votes relative to six companies who
proposed Chapter 11 restructuring plans which have all been confirmed by the Bankruptcy
Court5. In all six cases, there is always one or more classes of claims which are left
unimpaired by the plan6, and therefore, as ruled in the Confirmation Orders, those classes
become “non-voting” classes and they are deemed to accept the plan. However, it is
feasible to have a plan confirmed even if the impairment structure does not match the
priority structure. That is, senior classes are impaired while non-senior classes or junior
classes are left unimpaired7.
We capture the ‘impairment strategy’ by modelling the first stage of the restructuring
as a ‘private renegotiation’ where the first equity holders plan consists of a take-or-leave-it
offer to the impaired class/classes -hence, the ‘voting’ classes.
Also, according to Chapter 11 rules, on rejection of the first equity holders’ plan, any
player is allowed to file for competing plans. The bankruptcy code does not set any specific
agenda rules concerning subsequent proposals. Many different ways of modelling the
second stage of the renegotiation are possible8. We use an axiomatic approach and assume
that a three-player Nash bargaining outcome is achieved in the case of a disagreement
3The plan goes ahead if approved by all claimants.
4A creditor is said to be unimpaired if the plan calls for no scaling down of the coupon payment
scheduled in the existing contract.
5Data in Table A are taken from the ‘Plan Disclosure’ and ‘Confirmation Order’ from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Courts of: Southern District of New York, District of Delaware and District of Maryland.
6Of course, this is without taking into account “non-financial classes”, that is classes such as Priority
Claims (unpaid wages), Tax-Claims or Administrative Claims.
7For instance, in Table A, Vero Electronics plan leaves class 3 -‘Other Secured Claims’- unimpaired
and impairs class 2 -‘Senior Secured Credit Facilities’. Cases like this are not the most common, but not
even rare.
8For instance, Brown (1989) assumes that the Bankruptcy Court determines the order in which pro-
posals are voted and each proposal might rank first, second or third in the agenda with same probability.
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in the ‘private renegotiation’. In contrast to Brown (1989), we recognise the limit of a
‘refereed’ bargaining system. This ideally enables claimants to bring their own rights to
a court which cannot be influenced by parties and which automatically enforces rules.
Nevertheless, as argued by legal scholars, Chapter 11’s rules are idiosyncratic and judicial
discretion is granted in many circumstances9. Therefore, more realistically, our bargaining
setting account for exogenous asymmetries between parties which might reflect the ability
of claimholders to influence the court and extract a better package of concession during
renegotiation. In line with Welch (1997), such asymmetry can be explained as a reflection
of different organisation skills and reputation benefits10. Even though we do not attempt
to model the source of asymmetry, we introduce an exogenous bias in the Nash game which
may encompass a wide range of realistic circumstances whilst keeping the game-theoretic
framework simple and flexible. Therefore the importance of claimholders’ heterogeneity in
terms of bargaining power is stressed through an asymmetric Nash axiomatic bargaining
which jointly involves equity holders and creditors (a senior under-secured and a junior
creditor).
A number of papers have incorporated strategic interactions between debt and equity
holders during renegotiation. In comparison to the literature focusing on strategic debt
service, the distinctive feature of our model is the expansion of the set of strategic actions
available to the equity holders. As mentioned, the formal reorganisation accomplished
under Chapter 11, allows the equity holders to renegotiate vis a vis one creditor at a
time. Therefore, the strategic decision concerns not only the timing of bankruptcy but
also the creditor type, that is whether defaulting on the junior debt, the senior debt or
both. Moreover, the set of strategic actions is additionally expanded by recognising the
possibility of filing for formal renegotiation a number of times. Therefore, our setting
allows for sequential restructuring of different classes of debt.
Our results are as follows.
First, we show that there exists a unique sequence of equilibrium plans which, de-
pending on the parameterization, either impairs the junior creditor first and the senior
one later or vive versa. The equity holders’ ‘impairment strategy’ univocally depends on
factors such as the face value of claims, the bargaining power of players and the value
of collateral. Furthermore, the equilibrium impairment strategy derived is simple and
intuitive.
9See Kordana and Posner (1999) for a critical and exhaustive analysis of Chapter 11’s rules.
10As argued by Welch, unlike bond-holders a bank can have a good reputation effect for “tough be-
haviour” which might prevent other borrowers from opportunistic renegotiation.
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Second, our valuation of the senior (under-secured) and junior debt, through simple
closed-form solutions, provides some relevant results in terms of credit spreads. Interest-
ingly, the senior credit spread is not necessarily smaller than the junior one at all levels of
the state variable. This could not be the case in a pure liquidation scenario a` la Merton,
or under a restructuring system such as the UK Insolvency Law where equity holders have
less control over the renegotiation process11. The privilege of being senior creditor applies
in liquidation where, under absolute priority rule (APR), the line of priority and the col-
lateral are the fundamental and sole factors in determining the claim value. However, in
renegotiation players split the surplus generated by escaping inefficient liquidation, there-
fore the overall package of concession extracted also depends on the bargaining power of
creditors and the timing in which claims are restructured, that is the impairment strategy.
Furthermore, we provide a sufficient condition for avoiding spread inversions. Spread
inversions does not occur if the junior creditor is restructured/impaired before the senior
creditor12. In turn, such impairment strategy results to be the equilibrium strategy if
the senior claimholder has: (i) sufficiently low unsecured face value relatively to the
junior13 and/or (ii) high liquidation value 14 and/or (iii) sufficiently bargaining power
relatively to the junior creditor. Also, it is interesting to note that, in the case where the
senior and junior creditors are both unsecured, the priority of claims does not affect the
impairment strategy and, hence, the possibility of spread reversals. What matters is only
the bargaining power and face values of creditors (that is, point (i) and (iii) above). In
particular, the spread is higher for the creditor with higher ratio of face value to bargaining
power and this occurs regardless of the priority structure.
11The UK Insolvency Law has generally been perceived to allocate substantial privileges to creditors,
particularly to senior creditors holding a floating charge – that is, a floating collateral attached to the
overall company’s assets over which the company retains management autonomy. Yet, recently, new
insolvency provisions contained in the 2002 UK Enterprise Act seem to reduce the power of senior
creditors in the event of default by circumscribing the administrative receivership. The administrative
receiver, appointed by the holder of a floating charge, had the primary duty to realise sufficient assets to
pay creditors with higher priority. As argued by Gower (1992), in very few cases the receiver manages
so skilfully that the company is restored to solvency. This might be one of the reasons to move the law
toward Chapter 11 style – less creditor friendly.
12The senior claim will be restructured only if the firm value continues deteriorating and falls below a
certain level which triggers a new bankruptcy proceeding.
13That is, the unsecured portion of the senior face value is sufficiently small relative to the junior face
value.
14As in Mella-Barral Perraudin (1997), in our strategic default equilibrium the senior claim value in
liquidation is equal to the firm liquidation value.
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Third, our in-court restructuring can provide a benchmark for out-of-court restruc-
turing of single claims. We assume that there are no renegotiation costs in the formal
bankruptcy proceeding. Therefore, extending this assumption to out-of-court renegotia-
tion implies that our equilibrium in the formal renegotiation also provides the equilibrium
in private workouts. In this perspective, our setting justifies the possibility of out-of-court
debt forgiveness and strategic default on a single class of claims. This result might be rel-
evant when recognising that, although debt issues often contain cross default provisions,
this does not generally prevent private workout and strategic default on a single creditor.
Indeed, our equilibrium is consistent with the possibility of out-of-court strategic default
on single class of claims accommodated by other classes of claimants.
Fourth, we show that given the overall level of leverage the value of the firm does not
depend on the allocation of face value amongst senior and junior creditors because strate-
gic debt service eliminates direct bankruptcy costs. Therefore, our result of irrelevance
of debt priority structure is consistent with the Modigliani-Miller theorem. In addition,
this result extends and refines Mella-Barral, Perraudin’s results (where bankruptcy costs
from inefficient liquidation are eliminated through strategic bankruptcy) to a scenario
with multiple creditors.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. After a brief review of the related
literature, in Section 1, we introduce our main assumptions about the value of the firm
when it continues to operate and when it is liquidated. In Section 2, the bankruptcy rules
defining the game-theoretic structure of the formal renegotiation are set out. In Section
3, we show a simpler version of the model, describing a formal renegotiation between the
equity holders and a single creditor. This simplified scenario allows the reader to easily
understand the mathematical methodology extensively used in the next sections. This
section can also be understood as an application or an extension of MBP technique within
our bargaining settings. In Section 4, we present the model with two classes of debt. In
Section 5, we summarise and explain our results, in terms of timing of bankruptcy (and
impairment strategy), claim values, and restructuring plan. In Section 6, we consider the
implications of our previous results on the credit spreads. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature Overview
Initiated by Merton (1974), the traditional financial option approach to debt valuation
does not include the possibility of debt restructuring and has the shortcoming of under-
estimating corporate spreads. The crucial issue, only recently addressed in the literature,
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is that financial distress is often accompanied by renegotiations, debt rescheduling, for-
giveness, and rarely by liquidations15.
The new approach to value corporate debt incorporates strategic considerations and,
to a more limited extent, bargaining issues. This includes the work of Leland (1994),
Leland and Toft (1996), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Peraudin
(1997). Leland (1994) endogenises the restructuring threshold by allowing the payment
of promised coupons through additional equity issues until the equity value is driven to
zero. The initial paper by Leland (1994) has been refined and extended in several direc-
tions, including finite maturities and cash payout, by Leland and Toft (1996). Strategic
bankruptcy has been extensively refined by Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) who, in
coninuous-time setting, model strategic debt service when bankruptcy is costly16. Repre-
senting two polar cases, where either the equity holders or the creditor can make take-or-
leave-it offer, they conclude that strategic debt service results in deviations from absolute
priority intuitively because bankruptcy costs from inefficient liquidation allow equity hold-
ers to extract concessions from bond-holders. Moreover, their result significantly increases
corporate credit spreads for reasonable parameterization of the model. Exploring two al-
ternative bargaining formulations, such as strategic debt service and debt/equity swap,
Fan and Sundaresan (2000) endogenise dividend policy and the optimal value of the firm
under the two alternate renegotiations.
Even though to a limited extent, most of the recent works, including papers by Ander-
son and Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Hege and Mella-Barral
(2000), Hege and Mella-Barral (2002) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000), attempt to ad-
dress the importance of claimholders’ bargaining power. This limited literature recognises
the possibility that players might be heterogeneous in terms of bargaining power and, in
turn, the value of renegotiable claims might reflect such a heterogeneity. Yet, apart from
Fan and Sundaresan (2000) who accommodate varying bargaining powers, polar cases are
characterised regarding the distribution of bargaining power amongst equity holders and
creditors. To a certain extent, our paper can be compared to Fan and Sundaresan (2000)
in that, similarly, they characterise a Nash axiomatic solution and explicitly account for
varying bargaining power. Nevertheless, in contrast to Fan and Sundaresan (2000), we
stress the strategic interaction between three diverse players who can renegotiate the debt
service by mean of temporary concessions (strategic debt service, as defined by Anderson
15As reported by Franks and Torous (1989), after the introduction of the 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy Act,
the number of firms seeking for bankruptcy protection has tremendously increased.
16Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) model a similar scenario in a discrete-time framework.
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and Sundaresan (1996) and MBP (1997)), while Fan and Sundaresan (2000) focus on
two formulations of renegotiation (such as strategic debt service and debt/equity swap)
between two players.
Looking at the renegotiation framework, those few papers on strategic bankruptcy
accounting for bargaining power considerations, in particular Mella-Barral and Perraudin
(1997), Hege and Mella-Barral (2000), Hege and Mella-Barral (2002) and Fan and Sun-
daresan (2000), incorporate renegotiation by modelling private workouts where generally
disagreement triggers liquidation together with the Absolute Priority Rule. Corporate
debt valuation models of out-of-court renegotiations provide a useful framework to anal-
yse private workouts. However, we stress that a formal bankruptcy proceeding, such as
Chapter 11, differs from private workouts in a number of dimensions which affect the
values of corporate securities. Hence the applicability of informal renegotiation models to
in-court renegotiation system may be limited.
As argued by Sundaresan (2000), “the existence or absence of a bankruptcy code
and its perceived friendliness to borrowers or lenders, is a matter of significance in these
markets. Yet, we have very few pricing theories that have explicitly addressed this as a
structural issue in the determination of spreads”. The key role played by the bankruptcy
code in the valuation of renegotiable debt is yet to be modelled satisfactorily (Sundaresan
(2000)).
Partly, the lack of structural issues can be attributed to the fact that the concern in
pricing corporate debt has been more focused on liquidation than renegotiation scenarios,
and liquidation rules can be simply accounted for by incorporating the Absolute Priority
Rule17.
Furthermore, it is widely recognised that Chapter 11’s rules are quite tedious and
modelling the formal renegotiation might add excessive complications without any further
insight beyond the trivial fact that ‘strong’ players may obtain a bigger share of the ‘pie’
during renegotiation. The recent piece of literature on strategic bankruptcy and strategic
debt service seems to share this perspective and, to some extent, we share it as well, at
least in the situation where a firm has issued a single class of claims.
17See for instance Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) where the
occurrence of default is exogenous, or Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996) with endogenous bankruptcy
threshold level.
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1 Firm Value: Basic Assumptions
The value of the firm is driven by an underlying cash flow process, pt, which follows a
geometric Brownian motion with drift µ and volatility σ. For simplicity, we assume that
there are no variable costs and the scrapping value of the firm, γ, is constant. Moreover
agents are risk neutral and fully informed, with a risk-free interest rate r.
As the business can be shut down, the value of the firm can be written as
V (pt, p) =
pt
r − µ +
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
pt
p
)λ
where λ is the negative root of the quadratic equation18
r − µλ− σ
2
2
λ(λ− 1) = 0
and is equal to
λ =
−(µ− σ2/2)−√(µ− σ2/2)2 + 2σ2r
σ2
.
The value of the firm is maximised when the threshold level for shutting down, p, is such
that
p = argmaxV (pt, p),
which results into
p =
λ
λ− 1γ(r − µ).
In order to capture the idea that liquidation is generally inefficient as direct bankruptcy
costs arise, we assume that at any time the firm can be liquidated and sold to a potential
new owner who is as efficient as the original owner19. The liquidation sale of the firm
occurs according to a Nash bargaining situation between the initial owner (i.e. the equity
holders) and the new owner, where the terms of the agreement define the firm sale price,
say VL(pt), which is therefore the unknown of the bargaining problem. As well known,
the axiomatic solution to the Nash bargaining problem can be found by maximising the
“Nash product”, say NP , which is the product of the differences between the agreement
and disagreement payoff for each player. In our case, the agreements payoffs are: VL(pt)
to the initial owner (that is, the sale price agreed on and received by initial owner) and
18We do not provide here the derivation of the firm value through the stochastic calculus. We refer the
reader to Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a general analysis of entry and exit decision under uncertainty.
See also MBP (1997), for the similarity to our analysis.
19This means that the new owner can generate a value V (pt) by running a pure equity firm.
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V (pt)− VL(pt) to the new owner20. The disagreement payoffs are simply: γ to the initial
owner (i.e. if no agreement is reached, the firm is sold piecemeal at its scrapping value)
and zero to the new owner. Also, we do not restrict this bargaining situation to be
symmetric and therefore one can imagine that the initial owner has a relative bargaining
power α ∈ [0, 1) and, hence, the new owner has bargaining power 1 − α. Given these
specifications, the Nash product can be written as
NP = (VL(pt)− γ)α(V (pt)− VL(pt))1−α
and it can be easily found that the agreed sale price which maximises the Nash product
is
argmaxNP (VL(pt)) = VL(pt) = αV (pt) + (1− α)γ. (1)
Therefore from our bargaining formulation, the liquidation value is a weighted average
between V (pt) and γ, and hence it is always greater or equal to the scrapping value. Even
though this specification of liquidation value, VL, might partly resemble the formulation
by Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft21 (1996), our formulation of VL is more in line
with Mella-Barral, Perraudin (1997) in that their liquidation value is always below the
maximum firm value V (pt) but never below the scrapping value of the firm. Moreover their
bankruptcy costs become zero as the state variable, pt, approaches the optimal shutting
down trigger, which is also confirmed by our bargaining formulation of22 VL.
Furthermore, we assume that the firm has issued a perpetual debt with face value F .
The debt is allocated over two classes of claims, a senior and and a junior claim with
face values respectively Fs = bs/r and Fj = bj/r (and Fs + Fj = F ) where bs and bj are
the contractual coupon payments. To make the problem interesting we assume that the
senior claim is under-secured, i.e.23 Fs > γ.
20The new owner receives the firm value (free of debt) which is V (pt) and pays the agreed price VL(pt)
to the initial owner.
21Their formulation is VL = αV (in our notation).
22Note, the bankruptcy costs correspond to the difference V (pt) − VL(pt) which also rewrites as (1 −
α)(V (pt) − γ). Hence the bankruptcy costs converge to zero as pt tends to the optimal shutting down
trigger p.
23If the senior claim is fully secured renegotiation involves only the unsecured or under-secured claim.
Even though we do not analyse this case, we show in Section 3 how renegotiation resolves when the firm
has issued a single class of under-secured claims. Extending this scenario by adding up a fully secured
claim is straightforward.
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2 Bankruptcy Rules
This section shortly describes the basic assumptions about the formal bargaining frame-
work. The aim is to provide a set of rules to stylise the renegotiation process in the event
of default. Our settings are consistent with the U.S. corporate bankruptcy regulation
(Chapter 11).
Timing of Bankruptcy. As in Mella-Barral, Perraudin we assume that the firm can
voluntarily go into bankruptcy by ceasing paying the contractual coupon. Strategic
bankruptcy implies that the equity holders are free to issue new equity to cover operating
losses. As soon as the firm stops meeting its contractual obligation a formal renegotiation
procedure is triggered.
First Proposal and Impairment Rule. Following the US bankruptcy code for cor-
porate renegotiation (Chapter 11), we assume that the equity holders have an exclusive
right to propose a first reorganisation plan24, which must be approved by all claimants25.
Moreover, again as in Chapter 11, we assume that a creditor cannot reject a plan if
he/she receives cash equal to the face value of his claim or the plan calls for no scaling
down of the coupon payment scheduled in the existing contract. In this case the creditor
is said to be unimpaired26 by the plan and loses his veto power27. This ‘impairment’ rule
is useful to equity holders who can thus negotiate with one creditor at a time.
To sum up, at this first stage of the renegotiation, the equity holders have the right
to make a take-it or leave-it offer, which impairs one or both creditors. If this offer is
accepted by the impaired creditors (as the unimpaired lose veto power) the game ends
and restructuring goes ahead. This initial stage is referred to as ‘private game’.
Subsequent Proposals. On rejection of the first proposal, without any time delay,
the renegotiation moves to a second stage in which any player is allowed to file competing
plans.
The bankruptcy code does not set any specific agenda rules concerning subsequent
proposals. Therefore, on rejection of the equity holders’ proposal, the ‘rules’ of the game
24Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978, Section 1121.
25In Chapter 11, more precisely, approval of two-thirds majority within each class is required but to
keep the bargaining simple we treat each class of claimants as a single agent.
26Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978, Section 1124.
27Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978, Section 1126.
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become in a way unbiased towards different players. The result of the renegotiation
therefore can only depend on the ability of players to propose reorganisation plans. Many
different ways of modelling the second stage of the renegotiation are possible28. We opt
for a simple framework designed to highlight the effect of the different bargaining power
of players who might well differ in organisational skills. The formal structure of our
framework does not favour any player particularly.
We assume, at this stage, that the outcome of the renegotiation is provided by a Nash
axiomatic solution where players split the gains generated from restructuring the business
according to their bargaining strength29. The generalised Nash axiomatic approach seems
to best fit a formal renegotiation which implies the existence of a referee and requires
players to commit to their disagreement payoffs. Moreover the Nash axiomatic approach
is easy to handle and extends unchanged to multilateral bargaining situations. It also
provides a general and flexible result by allowing for asymmetric bargaining power30.
If no agreement is reached at this stage, without time delay, the firm goes into liq-
uidation, therefore the disagreement payoffs in the Nash bargaining correspond to the
liquidation payoff of each claimant.
More formally, let i = e, s, j denote the equity holders, the senior and the junior
creditor respectively. As well known31, in the Nash axiomatic bargaining player ‘i’ can
guarantee his/her disagreement payoff (i.e. liquidation payoff), Li, plus a share of the
surplus, V (pt)− VL(pt), which depends on the relative bargaining power32. Therefore, in
28For instance, Brown (1989) assumes that the Bankruptcy Court determines the order in which pro-
posals are voted and each proposal might rank first, second or third in the agenda with same probability.
29Introducing an exogenous bargaining power simply captures the idea that players might influence the
Bankruptcy Court as Chapter 11 is a judicially supervised bargaining process (see A. Schwartz, 2002).
Moreover in a mandatory Bankruptcy system where parties must use the state supplied procedure it
is more realistic to imagine that courts are not perfectly informed, and therefore the judge’s decision
is conditional to the information disclosed by the parties. Therefore the bargaining skills of players at
influencing the Court’s decision are crucial (see Welch, 1997).
30Fan and Sundaresan (2000) use the Nash axiomatic approach, with asymmetric bargaining power, to
model strategic debt service (as well as debt/equity swap) in a private workout between equity holders
and a single class of debt holders. Apart from the similarity in the Nash bargaining, their study crucially
differs from the current model. We deal with multiple classes of debt in formal bankruptcy while they
compare strategic debt service and debt/equity swap when there is only one class of debt holders.
31See Binmore and Dasgupta (1987) for an extensive analysis of the Nash bargaining solution. We
also refer to Fan and Sundaresan (2000), for the similarity to the current paper. For a more detailed
derivation of the Nash bargaining solution when uncertainty is modelled through a geometric Brownian
motion, see also Perraudin and Psillaki (1999).
32See Fan and Sundaresan (2000) for a similar characterisation of the Nash bargaining solution.
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the Nash bargaining, player ‘i”s claim value is equal to
Pi = ξi(V (pt)− VL(pt)) + Li, (2)
where ξi and Li denote the bargaining power and the liquidation payoff of player ‘i’ re-
spectively. We will refer to this stage as the ‘joint game’.
Liquidation. If the firm is liquidated, the Absolute Priority Rule (APR) applies. For-
mally, under APR the liquidation payoffs for s, j and e are respectively
Ls = min{Fs, VL} (3)
Lj = min{Fj, VL − Ls} (4)
Le = max{VL − Ls − Lj, 0}. (5)
Terms of Contracts and Enforceability. In practice, the renegotiation can be im-
plemented by reducing coupon payments while the firm is in a default region, through a
variable, state contingent, debt service flow as in MBP (1997). Therefore in what follows
we will focus on restructuring plans which consist of piecewise right-continuous service
flow function of the state variable pt, denoted as bi(pt) for i = s, j with bi(pt) < bi.
As the equity holders cannot commit to remain out of bankruptcy and can trigger
renegotiation at any time, creditors will underwrite a state contingent contract only if
this is self enforceable on the equity side (in the sense that the equity holders will not
have incentive to deviate). It is reasonable then to imagine that players bargain over
short term contracts, i.e. instantaneous payoffs, and that they can renegotiate continu-
ously. Though this might be not realistic, a continuous time renegotiation provides the
necessary benchmark to derive a self enforceable contract.
We conclude this section by summarising the bankruptcy rules and introducing some nota-
tion. When the equity holders trigger bankruptcy the renegotiation is structured as a two-
step game without time delay in between the first and the second stage. In the first game,
the “private game”, having the right to the first proposal, the equity holders make a take-
it or leave-it offer which might impair the junior creditor, the senior or both creditors. Let
the set of plans proposed by the equity holders be P = {Pe, Pj, Ps : Pe+Pj+Ps = V (pt)}.
At the second stage, “joint game”, each player can guarantee a payoff, denoted as Pi for
i = e, j, s which depends on the bargaining strength of players. Therefore a reorganisation
13
plan will be accepted at the first round by an ‘impaired claimant’, denoted by ‘i’, only
if Pi ≥ Pi. Panel A shows the two-step game in which, at the first round, the equity
holders choose whether to impair: i) the junior creditors by proposing a plan Pj ⊂ P
where Pj = {Pe, Pj, Ps : Pe ≥ Pe, Pj ≥ Pj, Ps < Ps}, ii) the senior creditor by propos-
ing a plan Ps ⊂ P where Ps = {Pe, Pj, Ps : Pe ≥ Pe, Pj < Pj, Ps ≥ Ps} or iii) both
the senior and the junior creditors and in this case the only feasible plan, say Ps,j ⊂ P ,
must guarantee that each player receives his reservation payoff in the joint game, i.e.
Ps,j = {Pe, Pj, Ps : Pe = Pe, Pj = Pj, Ps = Ps}.
Panel A: Bankruptcy game
Private game Joint game Liquidationr r r
‘e’ offers:
Pj impairing ‘j’,
or Ps impairing ‘s’,
or Ps,j impairing both.
on rejection by:
j
s
at least one
player
−→
i=e,j,s, share the
‘surplus’ according
to a payoff Pi.
on rejection
by at least
one player
−→
Liquidation
payoffs Li, for
i = e, j, s and∑
Li = VL
3 A Simplified scenario: one creditor only
Before describing the renegotiation with two creditors, we briefly show a simplified sce-
nario in which the firm has issued only one class of under-secured claims, with face
value Fc = bc/r > γ
33. This simplified scenario allows the reader to easily understand
the mathematical methodology we will extensively use in the next section in order to
calculate claims, equity value and restructuring plan (i.e. a debt service flow function
bc(pt) < bc). The technique shown here is similar to that developed by Mella-Barral, Per-
raudin34. Therefore, this section can also be understood as an application or an extension
of Mella-Barral, Perraudin’s technique within our bargaining setting.
33In this section, we use the subscript ‘c’ to denote the debt holder.
34As the purpose of this paper is quite different from that of Mella-Barral, Perraudin, we limit this
section to their mathematical development. Therefore, for an understanding of their economic intuition
the reader is referred to their paper.
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As there is only one creditor, some of the bankruptcy rules defined in Section 2 are
redundant here. More specifically, it is trivial to notice that the equity holders cannot
strategically use the impairment rule because there is no other class of claims which can
be left unimpaired. Moreover, the private game becomes redundant here, in the sense
that the equilibrium shares in the private game guarantee players with their equilibrium
shares in the joint game. In fact, given the equilibrium partition in the joint game, i)
the claim holder accepts the first equity holders’ proposal only if he/she receives at least
the equilibrium share of the joint game and ii) the equity holders will offer at most the
creditor’s equilibrium share of the joint game. Because there is no time delay between the
private and the joint game, and hence the value of the ‘pie’ does not change, it follows
that the equilibrium shares in the private and the joint game are the same. This allows us
to skip the private game and solve the bankruptcy game by simply solving the two-player
Nash axiomatic bargaining.
Apart from these changes, the model develops within the same setting and assump-
tions introduced in the previous section.
Hypotheses 1A. Assume that there exists a strategy in terms of stopping times, such
that i) when the state variable pt crosses a certain trigger, say pc, the equity holders rene-
gotiate with the debt holder in a Nash bargaining (through a service flow bc(pt) < bc).
Therefore, given that pc exists, one can formalise the equity holders’ decision problem
as follows
max
pc
E(pt, pc) (6)
st. E(pt, pc) = V (pt)− C(pt, pc))
C < Fc,
where C(pt, pc) is the debt value for pt ≥ pc and Fc is the face value of the debt.
Hypotheses 2A. When the state variable is in the range [p, pc] we assume that VL < Fc.
Because APR applies, this implies that Le = 0 and Lc = VL.
Renegotiation unfolds through a Nash bargaining where, by 2 and Hypothesis 2A, the
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shares to the equity holders and the creditor become respectively
Pe = ξe(V − VL) (7)
Pc = ξc(V − VL) + VL (8)
with
{
ξi ∈ I = [0, 1]∑
i ξi = 1
for i = e, c.
As the renegotiated shares are already defined by 7 and 8, left to determine are the
trigger pc and the service flow bc(pt).
In order to derive the bankruptcy trigger pc, one can solve the equity holders’ max-
imisation problem, or equivalently, the minimisation problem:
min
pc
C(pt, pc) (9)
st. C < Fc
with
{
C(pt) = Pc for pt = pc
where the debt value, C(pt, pc) can be written as
C(pt) =
bc
r
+
(
Pc(pc)−
bc
r
)(
pt
pc
)λ
. (10)
Solving the above problem yields the optimal trigger
p∗c =
λ
λ− 1
bc/r − γ(1− αξc)
αξc
(r − µ), (11)
with
αξc = ξc(1− α) + α. (12)
Moreover, as shown in Appendix 1, the trigger p∗c guarantees that Hypotheses 2A holds
35.
What is left to derive is the restructuring plan. Similarly as in MBP (1997), one can
derive the service flow function bc(pt) as follows. We know that, under risk neutrality, the
claim value, C(pt) is free of arbitrage opportunity if and only if bc(pt) solves the differential
equation
rC(pt) = s(pt) +
d
d4Et(Ct+4) |4=0, (13)
35In particular, we prove in Appendix 1 that Fc > Pc(p
∗
c), which (by 8) implies Fc > VL, i.e. Hypotheses
2A.
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where
sc(pt) =
{
bc if pt ∈ [p∗c ,∞)
bc(pt) if pt ∈ [p, p∗c)
subject to the following conditions. First, C(pt) must be continuous in level and first
derivative, which implies
C(p∗c) = Pc(p
∗
c) (14)
∂C(pt)
∂pt
|p∗c =
∂Pc(pt)
∂pt
|p∗c . (15)
This conditions are also known as smooth-pasting conditions. Secondly, equation 13 must
satisfy no arbitrage and no bubbles conditions which correspond respectively to
Pc(p) = γ, (16)
lim
pt→∞
C(pt) =
bc
r
. (17)
One can find that the debt value, C(pt), defined by 10, satisfies all the above conditions
36.
As shown in Appendix 3, there is a unique function, s(pt), which solves 13, and this
is given by
sc(pt) =
{
bc if pt ∈ [p∗c ,∞)
bc(pt) = αξcpt + (1− αξc)rγ if pt ∈ [p, p∗c)
with αξc defined in 12.
In Figure 1, we show the renegotiated value of the debt under strategic debt service.
For pt ≤ p∗c , the debt value is always between V (pt) and the liquidation value VL(pt).
Moreover it is equal to either V (pt) or VL(pt) only in the extreme scenarios where either
the creditor or the equity holders have full bargaining power. In these extreme cases our
result is similar to MBP37 and, to a certain extent, this section provides a generalisation
of their results which accommodate varying bargaining powers.
36In fact 10 satisfies conditions 14, 16 and 17 by construction. In Appendix 2, we show that the first
order condition to the equity holders’ maximisation problem, that is ∂C(pt, pc)/∂pc = 0, is equivalent to
the smooth pasting condition 15 which is, therefore, satisfied.
37There are marginal differences due to the modelling of direct and indirect bankruptcy costs. In Mella-
Barral, Perraudin, when the debt is not renegotiable, on default, the debt holders take over the firm and
run the business less efficiently (in terms of net cash flows) than the former management. This assumption
allows one to account also for indirect bankruptcy costs, while in our model indirect bankruptcy costs
are zero.
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Apart from the methodological purpose of this section, we want to stress that the
formal setting of the bankruptcy process does not play a crucial role when there are only
two players at the negotiating table. In fact, as argued, most of the literature on debt
restructuring does not focus on formal bankruptcy but rather on private workouts when
there is a single class of claims. In line with this literature, we have pointed out that most
of the bankruptcy rules appear to be redundant in this simplified scenario. Moreover, the
advantage of formalising the bankruptcy process seems quite limited in terms of economic
intuition. Quite different is the purpose of the bankruptcy rules when there are multiple
claims. As we show in the next section, all of the formal rules are strategically enforced
by the equity holders.
4 The Model
In this section we show how renegotiation is implemented when the firm has issued two
classes of claims as defined in Section 1. In this scenario, none of the bankruptcy rules
described in Section 2 is redundant. On the contrary, one can notice here how our
bankruptcy framework helps to define a unique equilibrium in terms of renegotiating
strategy and restructuring plan.
Hypotheses 1 Assume that there exists a strategy in terms of stopping times, such
that i) when the state variable pt crosses a certain trigger, say pj, the equity holders
start renegotiating with the junior creditor while pt < pj (by proposing a service flow
bj(pt) < bj) and ii) when pt crosses the trigger ps they start renegotiating with the senior
creditor (through a service flow bs(pt) < bs).
Now, let max{pj, ps} = p∗ and min{pj, ps} = p∗. Consistently within our bargaining
framework the equity holders strategy can be summarised as follows:
when p∗ < pt ≤ p∗ propose plan Pi, bi(pt) with
{
i = j if p∗ = pj
i = s otherwise
(18)
when p ≤ pt ≤ p∗ propose plan Ps,j,
{
bj(pt)
bs(pt)
(19)
(20)
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Therefore, the problem of the equity holders can be generalised as
max
pj ,ps
E(pt) (21)
st. E(pt) = V (pt)− S(pt, ps, pj)− J(pt, pj, ps)
S < Fs
J < Fj,
where E(pt), S(pt) and J(pt) denotes the values of the equity, the senior and the junior
debt and Fs and Fj are the face values.
Hypotheses 2 We assume that VL < Fs, when the state variable is in the range [p, ps].
As absolute priority applies, this implies that Le = 0, Lj = 0 and Ls = VL, therefore the
shares in the joint game will be
Pe = ξe(V − VL) (22)
Pj = ξj(V − VL) (23)
Ps = ξs(V − VL) + VL (24)
with
{
ξi ∈ I = [0, 1]∑
i ξi = 1
for i = e, j, s.
4.1 Equilibrium offers and trigger strategy
The purpose of this section is to determine the equilibrium values, E, J and S and the
optimal trigger strategy {pj, ps}. We already know, by 22-24, the values of equity, senior
and junior claims when38 p ≤ pt ≤ p∗, therefore the problem is to determine E, J and S
when p∗ < pt ≤ p∗.
Our argument to solve the renegotiation runs as follows.
We determine E, J , S and the trigger {pj, ps} under the two possible strategies: CASE
A) ps < pj, i.e. the equity holders impair the junior first, CASE B) ps ≥ pj, the senior
creditor is impaired first (if ps > pj) or jointly with the junior creditor (for ps = pj).
In order to determine the equilibrium values in both cases, A and B, we use a no
arbitrage argument (in the remainder point (i)) and a backward solution when solving for
38In fact, if p∗ = min{pj , ps} = ps, then by Hypotheses 2 VL(ps) < Fs and therefore, for pt < ps,
players’ payoffs are given by 22-24. If p∗ = min{pj , ps} = pj , then it is the case that pj < ps and,
being VL(pt) decreasing in pt, it holds from Hypotheses 2 that VL(pj) < VL(ps) < Fs, therefore again for
pt < ps, players’ payoffs are given by 22-24.
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the optimal triggers {pj, ps} (point (ii)).
Then, we show that depending on the level of the parameters, ξi (for i = e, j, s), Fj,
Fs, α, r and γ, a unique equilibrium strategy exists.
CASE A: ps < pj. The equity holders impair the junior creditor first, when ps < pt ≤ pj,
and then the senior creditor also when p < pt ≤ ps.
(i) We define here the junior claim equilibrium value under an accepted offer from the
equity holders in the private game.
Proposition 4.1.1 When ps < pt ≤ pj, the smallest offer by the equity holders to the
junior creditor is accepted if and only if J(pt, pj) = Pj + Ps − S(pt, ps).
Proof Let us define first an arbitrage strategy. In the private game, when ps < pt ≤ pj,
after an equity holders’ offer, the junior creditor can: 1) buy the senior claim at S(pt, ps),
2) reject the equity holders’ plan, therefore losing J(pt, ps) and 3) before the start of the
joint game, sell the senior claim at Ps(pt). The payoff from such a strategy, say Π, is
given by
Π = Pj + Ps − J(pt, pj)− S(pt, ps). (25)
We show in Appendix 4 that Π ≥ 0 under an equity holders’ proposal belonging to Pj.
Therefore an offer from the equity holders, is accepted by the junior creditor, if and only
if Π ≤ 0, that is J(pt, ps) ≥ Pj +Ps − S(pt, ps). Then we conclude that the smallest offer
which is accepted by the junior creditor must be such that Π = 0. 
Therefore, by Proposition 4.1.1, ‘j”s equilibrium value (under an accepted offer) is such
that Π = 0, which, by 25, implies
J(pt, pj) = Pj + Ps − S(pt, ps). (26)
(ii) The triggers ps and pj can be found by working backward. When pt is greater
than ps the senior value is equal to
S(pt, ps) =
bs
r
+
(
Ps(ps)−
bs
r
)(
pt
ps
)λ
, (27)
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which, minimised with respect to ps gives
39
p∗s2 =
λ
λ− 1
bs/r − γ(1− αξs)
αξs
(r − µ), (28)
with
αξs = ξs(1− α) + α. (29)
Then, minimising the junior value with respect to pj, which, by 26 and 28, is equal to
J(pt, pj) =
bj
r
+
{
Pj(pj) + Ps(pj)− S(pj, p∗s2)−
bs
r
}(
pt
pj
)λ
,
yields the optimal trigger
p∗j1 =
λ
λ− 1
(bs + bj)/r − γ(1− αξs,j)
αξs,j
(r − µ), (30)
with
αξs,j = (ξs + ξj)(1− α) + α. (31)
CASE B: ps ≥ pj. The equity holders impair the senior creditor first, when pj < pt ≤ ps,
and then the junior creditor also when p < pt ≤ pj.
(i) We derive here the senior claim equilibrium value under an accepted offer in the
private game when pj < pt ≤ ps. One can use a similar argument as the previous case
(point (i)). In Proposition 4.1.1, replacing the word ‘junior’ with ‘senior’, one can con-
clude that the senior claim equilibrium value (under an accepted offer) must be such
that40 Π = 0, which implies
S(pt, pj) = Pj + Ps − J(pt, pj). (32)
.
39We denote the optimal trigger by using the subscript ‘in’, with i = s, j and n = 1, 2, to stress
the order in which claims are impaired. Therefore, for instance, when the senior creditor is the second
claimant to be impaired we denote the optimal trigger level as ps2 (while when the senior creditor is
impaired first, the trigger level is denoted as ps1).
40As in the previous case, the gain, Π, is equal to Pj + Ps − J(pt, pj)− S(pt, pj).
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(ii) As before, by working backward one can find pj first and then ps. Minimising the
junior value, which, at pt > pj is equal to
J(pt, pj) =
bj
r
+
(
Pj(pj)−
bj
r
)(
pt
pj
)λ
, (33)
gives
p∗j2 =
λ
λ− 1
bj/r + γξj(1− α)
ξj(1− α) (r − µ). (34)
Then, by minimising the senior value with respect to ps, which (by 32 and 34), when
pt > ps, is equal to
S(pt, ps) =
bs
r
+
{
Pj(ps) + Ps(ps)− J(ps, p∗j2)−
bs
r
}(
pt
ps
)λ
,
and solving for the optimal trigger yields
p∗s1 =
λ
λ− 1
(bs + bj)/r − γ(1− αξs,j)
αξs,j
(r − µ), (35)
where αξs,j defined in equation 31.
Unique Equilibrium strategy
So far we have identified two optimal trigger strategies, in CASE A) a strategy {p∗j1, p∗s2}
if the junior is impaired first and, in CASE B) a strategy {p∗j2, p∗s1} if the senior creditor
is impaired first (that is p∗s1 > p
∗
j2) or jointly (p
∗
s1 = p
∗
j2) with the junior creditor.
In the remainder of this section we will show that there is a unique equilibrium strat-
egy. The equilibrium is unique if once the equity holders impair creditor i = s or j, leaving
creditor i 6= i unimpaired, they will not invert strategy in the future (that is, impairing
i 6= i and paying the full contractual coupon to creditor i).
First, notice that regardless of the fact that the creditor who is impaired first is the
junior (as in CASE A)) or the senior one (CASE B)) the higher bankruptcy trigger does
not change. In fact,
p∗j1 = p
∗
s1.
Therefore the equilibrium strategy will only depend on the triggers ps2 and pj2.
Let us denote with p¯ the trigger p∗j1 = p
∗
s1. One can find, by some simple algebra, that
p∗s2 < p¯ if and only if
bj
r
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) > F − γ
p∗j2 ≤ p¯ if and only if bjr
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) ≤ F − γ.
(36)
These two inequalities allow us to state our crucial result in the following Proposition.
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Proposition 4.1.2 The optimal strategy is unique and there is no ambiguity in the path
of the renegotiation. The equity holders play the optimal strategy
{p∗j1, p∗s2} iff bjr
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) > F − γ
{p∗s1, p∗j2} iff bjr
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) ≤ F − γ.
(37)
Proof When p∗s2 < p¯ (i.e.
bj
r
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) > F−γ) is also true that p∗j2 > p¯, but p∗j2 is an optimal
trigger only if p∗j2 ≤ p∗s1 = p¯. Therefore, we can conclude that p∗j2 does not exist in this
case and hence there is a unique strategy left, that is {p∗j1, p∗s2}. Under this strategy the
equity holders impair the junior creditor first when pt = p¯ and senior later, when pt = p
∗
s2.
If instead
bj
r
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) ≤ F − γ then p∗j2 ≤ p¯ and p∗s2 > p¯. Nevertheless, for p∗s2 to be
optimal it must be the case that p∗s2 ≤ p∗j1 = p¯. Similarly as the previous case, we con-
clude that p∗s2 does not exist and there is only one strategy left corresponding to {p∗j2, p∗s1}.
Therefore the equity holders impair the senior creditor first (i.e. when pt = p¯) and, when
pt = p
∗
j2, the junior creditor also. 
Last, as shown in Appendix 5, one can notice that under both strategies, {p∗s2, p∗j1} and
{p∗s1, p∗j2}, Hypotheses 2 holds, that is VL(ps) < Fs (with ps equal to either p∗s2 or p∗s1).
This guarantees that the senior claims is never renegotiated when the senior creditor could
guarantee the full face value in liquidation.
4.2 Restructuring plan
We have derived in the previous section the equilibrium value of claims and the trigger
strategy which defines the optimal timing for restructuring each class of claims. In this
section, we will determine the debt service flow function which guarantees each creditor
with his/her equilibrium values during renegotiation.
Depending on the set of parameters in our model, we have shown that the equilibrium
trigger strategy is either {p∗s2, p∗j1} (if bjr
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) ≤ F − γ) or {p∗j2, p∗s1} (if else) with cor-
responding claims equilibrium values, J(pt) and S(pt), defined in CASE A) and B) (of
Section 4.1) respectively. Therefore, according to the two possible sets of parameters
there are two corresponding restructuring plans defined in the following propositions.
Our derivation of the debt service flow functions follows the same line as the derivation
of bc(pt) in Section 3. Therefore, we only present here our results and refer the reader to
the Appendixes for the technical steps.
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Proposition 4.2.1 If
bj
r
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) > F − γ the equilibrium restructuring plans impair the
junior and senior creditor according to service flow functions respectively
bj(pt) = αξs,jpt + (1− αξs,j)γr − ss(pt) for pt ≤ p∗j1 (38)
ss(pt) =
{
bs for p
∗
s2 < pt
bs(pt) = αξspt + (1− αξs)γr for pt ≤ p∗s2
(39)
with αξs,j and αξs defined by 31 and 29 respectively.
Proof See Appendix 6. 
Proposition 4.2.2 If
bj
r
(
αξs,j
ξj(1−α)) ≤ F − γ the equilibrium restructuring plans impair the
junior and senior creditor according to service flow functions respectively
bs(pt) = αξs,jpt + (1− αξs,j)γr − sj(pt) for pt ≤ p∗s1 (40)
sj(pt) =
{
bj for p
∗
j2 < pt
bj(pt) = ξj(1− α)(pt − γr) for pt ≤ p∗j2
(41)
Proof See Appendix 7. 
5 Comments and Summary of results
In this section we recombine and explicit our results in Section 4. The purpose is to ex-
plain our results with particular emphasis on the effect of bargaining powers, face values
and allocation of priority. We group our findings into three categories : A) timing of
bankruptcy and impairment strategy, B) equity and claims values and C) restructuring
plan.
A) Timing of bankruptcy and impairment strategy. The equity holders trigger
bankruptcy, and file a plan Pi or Ps,j,41 according to the following equilibrium strategy:
when p∗i2 < pt ≤ p¯ file plan P6=i, with
{
i = s if
bj
r
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) > F − γ
i = j otherwise
(42)
when p ≤ pt ≤ p∗i2 file plan Ps,j, (43)
41We remind the reader that a plan Pi impairs only creditor i and Ps,j impairs both creditors.
24
where
p∗s2 =
λ
λ− 1
bs/r − γ(1− αξs)
αξs
(r − µ), (44)
p∗j2 =
λ
λ− 1
bj/r + γξj(1− α)
ξj(1− α) (r − µ), (45)
p¯ = p∗j1 = p
∗
s1 =
λ
λ− 1
(bs + bj)/r − γ(1− αξs,j)
αξs,j
(r − µ), (46)
and
αξs = ξs(1− α) + α, (47)
αξs,j = (ξs + ξj)(1− α) + α. (48)
First, notice that, given the overall face value of the debt, F , the higher bankruptcy
trigger is independent of the priority structure of claims. Bankruptcy is triggered the first
time, as soon as the state variable crosses p∗s1 = p
∗
j1. In other words, given the overall
creditors’ bargaining power and the face value F , the default region, [p, p¯ = p∗s1 = p
∗
j1]
is independent of the type of creditor impaired first and is not affected by the allocation
of debt amongst creditors. In order to highlight the irrelevance of the debt priority
structure over the default region, one can compare two firms which differ only for their
debt allocation. Imagine, for instance the limiting case of an identical firm (where the
equity holders have the same bargaining power, ξe) with just one creditor with a claim
of face value F = Fj + Fs and bargaining power ξc = 1 − ξe = 1 − ξs − ξj. As shown
in Section 3, renegotiation starts when pt crosses
λ
λ−1
F/r−γ(1−αξc )
αξc
(r − µ) which coincides
with the optimal trigger42 p∗s1 = p
∗
j1 = p¯.
Therefore, not surprisingly, what defines the default region is the level – not the allo-
cation – of F and the overall bargaining power of creditors vis a vis the equity holders.
The higher F and/or ξj + ξs the earlier bankruptcy occurs
43.
If, on the one hand, the debt priority structure (i.e. the allocation of face value amongst
senior and junior creditors) does not alter the default region, on the other hand it crucially
determines the timing and the order in which claims will be impaired during bankruptcy.
In a way, one could say that, given the overall face value, the priority structure of claims
determines the ‘default regions of each single claim’. Using this terminology, depending
on the claims face values, there are two possible default regions for each debt-holder: i)
42Simply replace the notation bj/r + bs/r instead of F and notice that αξc = αξs,j .
43In fact, p∗s1 = p
∗
j1 increases with F and ξj + ξs.
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[p, p∗j1 = p
∗
s1] and [p, p
∗
s2], respectively for the junior and the senior, if
bj
r
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) > F − γ or
ii) [p, p∗s1 = p
∗
j1] and [p, p
∗
j2], if instead
bj
r
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) ≤ F − γ 44.
The intuition behind this result is immediate. We know that the equity holders always
start renegotiating at p∗s1 = p
∗
j1 and when the state variable crosses this trigger they would
benefit from reducing coupon payments to the creditor whose face value is relatively high
with respect to the overall face value F . Therefore, given F , if, for instance, bj/r is high
enough the equity holders would benefit from impairing the junior creditor first.
The former consideration is not the only factor determining the order of the impaired
claims. The benefit from impairing the creditor with higher face value must be weighted
against the ‘strength’ of that creditor, that is, the ability to extract a valuable package
of concessions in renegotiation. This depends on the liquidation value of the firm, the
priority of the claim and the creditor’s bargaining power. The higher α and γ, the bigger
the liquidation value, which, in turn, strengthens the bargaining position of the senior
whilst weakens that of the junior45. Therefore, when the liquidation value is sufficiently
high, the equity holders impair the junior creditor, who can extract smaller concessions
than the senior claimant. The argument runs similarly and the same conclusion holds
when the bargaining power of the junior creditor is sufficiently small. If this is the case,
again, the equity holders impair first the junior creditor, that is, the ‘weak’ player. All
these factors are captured by the inequality
bj
r
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) R F −γ which determines the order
in which claims are impaired. In fact, for instance, it is more likely that
bj
r
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) > F −γ
(and hence the junior is impaired first) for high levels of bj/r, α and γ and low level of
ξj, consistently with our intuitive explanation.
Finally, our argument can be clearly summarised by rearranging the above inequality
as
αξs
Fs − γ R
ξj(1− α)
Fj
.
Here, each side of the inequality measures the ‘intensity of the actual bargaining strength’.
Precisely, the terms αξs and ξj(1−α) can be interpreted as actual bargaining strength of
creditors in that these terms account for i) the exogenous bargaining power, ξi, and ii) α
which determines the disagreement/liquidation payoff46(which is an endogenous compo-
44When bjr
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) = F − γ, p∗j2 = p∗s1, that is claims are jointly impaired and the two default regions
are the same.
45Because the junior creditor is a residual claimant, he/she purely benefits from receiving a share of
the firm continuation surplus, V − VL, while the senior creditor, due to the priority of his/her claim,
guarantees also the full liquidation value.
46In more details, α represents the percentage liquidation payoff of the unsecured part of the senior
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nent of the bargaining strength). Moreover, in the above inequality, the actual bargaining
strength is measured in terms of units of unsecured face value (that is, Fs − γ and Fj),
which explains why one can refer to each side of the inequality as to intensity of bargain-
ing strength. By using this terminology, we conclude that the equity holders impair first
the creditor with smaller intensity of actual bargaining strength.
B) Equity and claims values. According to the previous trigger strategies, if the
junior creditor is a ‘weak’ player in comparison to the senior one, the equity holders file
a plan:
Pj, ∀ pt ∈ (p∗s2, p¯]
Ps,j, ∀ pt ∈ [p, p∗s2]
⇒ if bj
r
αξs,j
ξj(1− α) > F − γ (49)
which guarantees creditors with the following claims’ values:
S(pt) =
 bsr +
(
Ps(p
∗
s2)− bsr
) (
pt
p∗s2
)λ
if pt > p
∗
s2
Ps(pt) if pt ≤ p∗s2
(50)
J(pt) =

bj
r
+
(
Pj(p¯) + Ps(p¯)− S(p¯)− bjr
)(
pt
p¯
)λ
if pt > p¯
Pj(pt) + Ps(pt)− S(pt) if p∗s2 < pt ≤ p¯
Pj(pt) if pt ≤ p∗s2
(51)
If instead the junior creditor is a ‘strong’ player, the equity holders impair first the
senior claimant by filing a plan:
Ps, ∀ pt ∈ (p∗j2, p¯]
Ps,j, ∀ pt ∈ [p, p∗j2]
⇒ if bj
r
αξs,j
ξj(1− α) ≤ F − γ (52)
which guarantees creditors with the following claims’ values:
S(pt) =

bs
r
+
{
Pj(p¯) + Ps(p¯)− J(p¯)− bsr
}(
pt
p¯
)λ
if pt > p¯
Pj(pt) + Ps(pt)− J(pt) if p∗j2 < pt ≤ p¯
Ps(pt) if pt ≤ p∗j2
(53)
J(pt) =
 bjr +
(
Pj(p
∗
j2)− bjr
)(
pt
p∗j2
)λ
if pt > p
∗
j2
Pj(pt) if pt ≤ p∗j2
(54)
debt. In fact, by definition, α can be written as (VL − γ)/(V − γ).
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where
Pe = ξe(V − VL) (55)
Pj = ξj(V − VL) (56)
Ps = ξs(V − VL) + VL. (57)
We show in Figure 2, 3 and 4 the equilibrium claim values resulting from three alter-
native scenarios where the junior is impaired first (that is, p∗s2 < p
∗
j1 = p¯, as in Figure
2), together (i.e. p∗s2 = p
∗
j1 = p¯, Figure 3) or after the senior has been impaired (that is,
p∗j2 < p
∗
s1 = p¯, see Figure 4).
One can notice that, given the creditors’ bargaining power ξs + ξj and the face value
F , the priority structure of claims does not affect the equity value. In fact, the debt
value, S(pt) + J(pt), remains the same regardless of the allocation of face value amongst
creditors.
This result is in line with MBP (1997), in that the equity value is affected by the
overall face value and the bargaining power of the equity holder. Moreover it extends
MBP results to a multiple creditors scenario, in that the allocation of debt amongst
classes is irrelevant.
Furthermore, by preventing inefficient liquidation, strategic debt service eliminates
direct bankruptcy costs. This result refines the Modigliani-Miller theorem in terms of
irrelevance of the debt priority structure.
We conclude that, in a frictionless market, like the one depicted in our model, whether
there exists a debt optimal priority structure, this cannot be derived from the path of the
renegotiation during bankruptcy.
Further analytical results, directly related to the equilibrium claim values, can be
found in terms of credit spreads. We refer the reader to the next section where the im-
plications of the claim values on the spreads are investigated in detail.
C) Restructuring plan. The equity holders file either a restructuring plan Pj or
a plan Pj, depending on the level of our parameters. After impairing either class of
claims they will propose an equilibrium plan Ps,j.
The equilibrium plan Pj consists of a promise to pay the following coupon flows:{
bj(pt) = αξs,jpt + (1− αξs,j)γr − bs
bs
⇒ for pt ≤ p¯ (58)
which impairs the junior while leaves unchanged the contractual coupon to the senior.
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When instead the equity holders file a plan Ps they promise to pay the pair of coupon
flows {
bj
bs(pt) = αξs,jpt + (1− αξs,j)γr − bj
⇒ for pt ≤ p¯ (59)
which impairs the senior creditor without rescheduling payments for the junior claimant.
After impairing only one creditor by filing a plan Pj or Ps, the equity holders will file
the equilibrium plan Ps,j which consists of a pair of debt service flow functions:{
bj(pt) = ξj(1− α)(pt − rγ)
bs(pt) = αξspt + (1− αξs)γr
⇒ for pt ≤
{
p∗s2 if Pj has been filed
p∗j2 else
(60)
This equilibrium plan impairs both creditors at once.
In Figure 5, 6 and 7, we show the three possible pairs of debt service flow functions
resulting from three different sequences of bankruptcy plans such as {Pj,Ps,j} (in Figure
5), {Ps,j} (in Figure 6, where claims are jointly impaired at the trigger level p∗s2 = p∗j2 = p¯)
and {Ps,Ps,j} (in Figure 7).
6 Implications on Credit spreads and risk premia
The purpose of this section is that of showing the effect of our renegotiation framework
on the credit spreads of the two classes of debt. It is intuitive that the opportunity of
rescheduling debt, by allocating the continuation surplus of an economically viable firm,
allows creditors to improve their payoffs as a group. The appropriation of a share of this
surplus gives each creditor the incentive to successfully renegotiate his/her claim vis a
vis the equity holders. The opportunity to renegotiate should therefore reduce the credit
spreads simply because it increases the claim values with respect to a pure liquidation
scenario.
In order to isolate the effect of the renegotiation on credit spreads we first define the
spread and then we decompose it into two kinds of premia: a default and a renegotiation
premium.
Because our coupon bonds are perpetuity the spread, say CS, can be measured as
CSi =
bi
Bi
− r with

i = s, j
Bs = S(pt)
Bj = J(pt),
(61)
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where the term bi
Bi
represents the yield of the risky bond. By adding and subtracting the
liquidation payoff, Li, the credit spread can be rewritten as
r
bi/r − Li
Bi
+ r
Li −Bi
Bi
. (62)
This formulation helps at identifying two kinds of premia. The first term, referred to
as LPi, can be interpreted as a pure liquidation premium in that it measures the loss
in liquidation (in terms of difference between the promised contractual coupon payments
and the payoff of the claim in liquidation). The second term, shortly denoted as RPi, can
be instead understood as a renegotiation premium, that is, the loss or the gain following
from seizing the firm’s assets through liquidation instead of continuing and renegotiating
debt according to our optimal restructuring plan.
Similarly as in Mella-Barral, Perraudin, renegotiation premia may be measured in
terms of percentage contribution to the spread. Denoting the percentage renegotiation
premium as rpi, this can be easily written as
47
rpi =
RPi
CSi
=
Li −Bi
bi/r −Bi , (63)
which applied to the senior and junior claims yields
rps =
min{bs/r, VL(pt)} − S(pt)
bs/r − S(pt) , rpj =
min{bj/r, VL(pt)− Ls} − J(pt)
bj/r − J(pt) . (64)
In order to have a first glance at the shape of the risk premia, in Figure 8, we plot the
credit spreads, CSi, and the associated percentage renegotiation premia, rpi, for the se-
nior and junior bonds (black and red line respectively). The left and right diagrams in
each row of Figure 8 show the spread and the resulting renegotiation premia respectively.
Moving from the top row to the bottom one, we show the spreads and the renegotiation
premia for different allocations of bargaining power between senior and junior creditor
given the bargaining power of the equity holders and all other parameters48. Particularly
from the top to the bottom of Figure 8, the senior’s bargaining power, ξs, increases from
0 to 0.6 (and, given the equity bargaining power, ξe = 0.3, the junior bargaining power
diminishes correspondingly).
47Once determined the percentage contribution of the renegotiation premium, the effect of the liqui-
dation premium can be written as LP/CS = 1−RP/CS.
48The other parameters, which remain unchanged, are: ξe = 0.3, α = 0.2, µ = 0.03, σ = 0.15, r = 0.08,
γ = 200, F = 600, Fs = 400.
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Looking at the spreads in Figure 8, quite interesting is the fact that the senior credit
spread is not necessarily smaller than the junior one at all level of the state variable.
This could not be the case in a pure liquidation scenario, but it is not surprising within
a renegotiation framework. The senior creditor has a privileged position when the firm is
liquidated and the priority of his/her claim is the crucial and sole factor at determining
the claim value. When instead renegotiation is allowed, holding a senior position plays
still a fundamental role49 but the overall package of concession extracted during renego-
tiation, and hence the claim value, also depends on the bargaining strength. Therefore,
holding a senior but largely under-secured claim50 does not imply a smaller credit spread
compared to a junior claimant. What contributes at reducing the senior credit spread is
therefore the combination of a high liquidation payoff51 and strong bargaining power vis
a vis other players. The credit spreads in Figure 8 captures this second factor: the senior
spread decreases (and the junior increases) when ξs increases.
Looking at the percentage renegotiation premia (second column of Figure 8), these ex-
clusively determine the overall spread for high levels of the state variable. Precisely, by
definition of rpi, when the state variable is high enough (such that VL ≥ bs/r) then rps = 1
and when pt is even higher (such that VL − bs/r ≥ bj/r) then also rpj = 1. Therefore for
high levels of the state variable the spreads are purely due to the renegotiation premia.
When pt decreases, by renegotiating, creditors can extract concession depending on
their bargaining power. Therefore the renegotiated claim value becomes greater or at
least equal52 to the liquidation value. This is the positive contribution of a renegotiation
scenario in the sense it contributes at reducing the spreads. Notice in fact that both
premia, rps and rpj, become negative when pt and hence the firm’s liquidation value
decrease.
Moreover, looking at 64 it is clear why the renegotiation premia in Figure 8 converge
to zero for small level of the state variable. In fact, when pt approaches p, the firm is
liquidated and therefore the option to renegotiate disappears. Trivial to say that at p the
credit spread becomes a pure liquidation premium.
Comparison between senior and junior spread.
49In fact, it determines the disagreement payoffs in the Nash bargaining.
50This is the case in Figure 8 where the senior face value is 400, the scrapping value of the firm is only
200 and α = 0.2.
51In fact, the senior spread shift down when α and γ increase.
52This is the case when a creditor’s bargaining power is equal to zero.
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So far, little we have said about the difference between the senior and the junior spread.
We have briefly argued that the difference is determined by the bargaining power of play-
ers in renegotiation and by the fact that the senior creditor is partially secured in the
event of liquidation. The comparison between the two spreads is in a way biased by the
fact itself that one creditor is partially secured vis a vis the other creditor.
A more meaningful comparison between the two spreads can be achieved by stripping
the senior claim for the firm’s scrapping value. By proceeding this way, the junior and
the senior claim (stripped for γ) are made more comparable in that they will both receive
zero when pt approaches p and the firm goes into liquidation. Stripping the senior claim
for γ also helps at isolating the effect of the secured part of the claim on the spread.
Moreover by comparing the junior spread and the spread of the senior ‘unsecured’
claim53 we will highlight an interesting property of our model. This provides a sufficient
condition for the senior spread to be smaller than the junior for all levels of the state
variable.
We start decomposing the senior spread to isolate the effect of the secured part of the
claim. Notice first that by 61) the spread of the senior claim can be rewritten as
CSs = r
bs/r − S
S
= r
(bs/r − γ)− (S − γ)
S
· S − γ
S − γ
= r
Fˆs − Sˆ
Sˆ
· Sˆ
S
(65)
where Sˆ = S − γ and Fˆs = Fs − γ. The two factors in equation 65) can be interpreted as
follows. The first term, denoted as
ĈSs = r
Fˆs − Sˆ
Sˆ
, (66)
represents the credit spread on the senior claim stripped for the scrapping value γ, i.e.
the spread of the unsecured part of the claim.
The second term, Sˆ/S, captures the effect of the secured part of the claim on the
overall credit spread CSs. In fact, the bigger is the secured part of the claim the smaller
is the ratio Sˆ/S and the credit spread CSs.
We can now compare the spreads of the two ‘unsecured’ claims by calculating the
53We will shortly use the term ‘unsecured’ to refer to a senior claim stripped for the scrapping value γ.
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difference ĈSs − CSj, which by some simple algebra yields
ĈSs − CSj = r FˆsJ − SˆFj
SˆJ
. (67)
We can now state the main result of this section in the following Proposition.
Proposition 6.0.3 The difference ĈSs −CSj is positive if and only if the optimal stop-
ping strategy is {p∗j2, p¯}. While, ĈSs −CSj is negative if and only if the optimal strategy
is {p∗s2, p¯}.54.
Proof See Appendix 8. 
The intuition behind this result is clear. As argued in Section 5), point A, the trig-
ger strategy i) orders creditors on the ground of their actual bargaining strength, and
according to this ii) identifies the claims default regions. Therefore, the bigger the actual
bargaining strength of a creditor, the smaller the claim default region and the bigger the
claim value, which, in turn, reduces the credit spread.
The relevance of this result is immediate. The above proposition provides a sufficient
condition for detecting the case where CSs < CSj for any level of the state variable.
In fact, the inequality CSs < CSj rearranges into ĈSsSˆ/S < CSj, which holds if
55
ĈSs < CSj.
These results are shown in Figure 9, where, again, we show the credit spreads of Figure
8 and we add the function ĈSs (dashed line) which, depending on the parameterisation
and, in turn, the stopping strategy, is above or below the credit spread of the junior
creditor (red line). The difference ĈSsSˆ/S−CSj appears in the second column of Figure
9. From our analytical result, the difference is positive in the first two plots, where the
senior creditor is impaired first, whilst the sign reverts in the last two plots where the
junior creditor is the first to be impaired.
54The equality holds, and ĈSs − CSj = 0 when p∗j2 = p∗s2 = p¯.
55As already argued, the term Sˆ/S is always smaller than one for any under-secured claim.
33
7 Conclusions
This paper stresses the crucial role of the formal bankruptcy process when there are
more than two players at the negotiating table. Obviously, the formal bankruptcy rules
-such as the right to file a first proposal and the impairment rule- are redundant in
the simple scenario where the equity holders renegotiate vis a vis a single creditor. In
contrast, when multiple creditors are involved, the equity holders strategically enforce
the set of bankruptcy rules which crucially determines a unique equilibrium restructuring
plan. Therefore, to a certain extent, the model discussed above provides a framework for
a positive analysis of Chapter 11, which integrates legal and economics features.
The current model provides diverse economic implications. When the equity holders
can renegotiate with one creditor at a time, as in Chapter 11, the strategic decision
concerns not only the timing of bankruptcy but also the order in which creditors will
be impaired. We conclude that the equity holders impair the creditor with a smaller
intensity of actual bargaining strength first, that is, the ratio of actual bargaining power
to unsecured face value. Therefore, depending on the parameterisation (which determines
the above ratio, and, hence, the impairment strategy), in equilibrium the equity holders
will strategically default on a single class of claims when the state variable reaches a
certain trigger level. If the state variable continues to decrease to a second (lower) trigger
level, then the equity holders will default on both claims jointly. This kind of equilibrium,
where single claims are restructured individually, is consistent with the fact that private
workouts are often targeted to single classes of claims, and that cross default provisions
do not prevent a private renegotiation.
Moreover, we show that, given the total debt face value and the overall bargaining
power of creditors, the first (higher) bankruptcy trigger and the equity value do not
depend on the allocation of face value and bargaining power amongst creditors.
Interestingly, we find that the senior credit spread is not necessarily smaller than the
junior one at all levels of the state variable. This could not be the case in a pure liquidation
scenario, however in a renegotiation framework it is not surprising. The senior creditor
has a privileged position when the firm is liquidated and the priority of his/her claim is
the crucial and sole factor at determining the claim value. When renegotiation is allowed,
holding a senior position still plays a fundamental role (by affecting the disagreement
payoffs), but the overall package of concession extracted during renegotiation also depends
on the bargaining strength. Therefore, holding a senior but largely under-secured claim
does not guarantee a smaller credit spread with respect to other claimants. What reduces
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the senior credit spread is therefore the combination of a large liquidation payoff and
strong bargaining power vis a vis other players.
Our result on the spreads is crucially related the equilibrium impairment strategy.
We have shown that the impairment strategy i) orders creditors on the basis of their
actual bargaining strength, and according to this ii) identifies the claims default regions.
Therefore, the bigger the intensity of the actual bargaining strength of a creditor, the
smaller the claim default region and the bigger the claim value, which in turn, reduces
the credit spread. Therefore, depending on the parameterisation, an equilibrium plan
which impairs the junior first guarantees that the senior spreads is below the junior one
for any level of the state variable.
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Appendix
Appendix 1
We prove here that the trigger p∗c guarantees that Hypotheses 2A in Section 2) holds, that
is Fc > VL. In particular, it is convenient to prove that Fc > Pc(p
∗
c) which also implies
Fc > Pc(p
∗
c) ≥ VL.
First, one can rearrange Pc as follows
Pc = ξc(V − VL) + VL
= [α+ ξc(1− α)]V + (1− α)(1− ξc)γ
= αξcV + (1− αξc)γ.
Then, the inequality Fc > Pc(p
∗
c) can be rearranged as
Fc > αξc
[
p∗c
r − µ +
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
p∗c
p
)λ]
+ (1− αξc)γ
Fc > αξc
[
λ
λ− 1
Fc − γ(1− αξc)
αξc
+
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
p∗c
p
)λ]
+ (1− αξc)γ
Fc − γ(1− αξc)
αξc
>
λ
λ− 1
Fc − γ(1− αξc)
αξc
− γ
λ− 1
(
Fc − γ(1− αξc)
γαξc
)λ
Fc − γ(1− αξc)
γαξc
>
(
Fc − γ(1− αξc)
γαξc
)λ
Notice that this last inequality is always satisfied being λ negative and the term
Fc − γ(1− αξc)
γαξc
=
p∗c
p
is greater than one (that is, p∗c > p) as shown by the following algebra.
p∗c =
λ
λ− 1
Fc − γ(1− αξc)
αξc
(r − µ) > λ
λ− 1γ(r − µ) = p
Fc > γαξc + γ(1− αξc)
Fc > γ.
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Appendix 2
Here, we show that the first order condition to the equity holders’ maximisation problem,
that is ∂C(pt, pc)/∂pc = 0, is equivalent to the smooth pasting condition 15), that is
∂C(pt)
∂pt
|p∗c= ∂Pc(pt)∂pt |p∗c .
First, develop the first order condition, ∂C(pt, pc)/∂pc = 0, as follows:
∂
[
bc
r
+
(
Pc(pc)−
bc
r
)(
pt
pc
)λ]
/∂pc = 0
∂
(
Pc(pc)− bcr
)
∂pc
(
pt
pc
)λ
+
∂
(
pt
pc
)λ
∂pc
(
Pc(pc)−
bc
r
)
= 0
∂
(
Pc(pc)− bcr
)
∂pc
= λpc
−1
(
Pc(pc)−
bc
r
)
. (68)
Secondly, rearrange the smooth pasting condition, ∂C(pt)
∂pt
|p∗c= ∂Pc(pt)∂pt |p∗c , as
∂
[
bc
r
+
(
Pc(pc)− bcr
) (
pt
pc
)λ]
∂pt
|p∗c =
∂
(
Pc(pc)− bcr
)
∂pt
|p∗c
λpt
λ−1pc−λ
(
Pc(pc)−
bc
r
)
|p∗c =
∂
(
Pc(pc)− bcr
)
∂pt
|p∗c
λpc
−1
(
Pc(pc)−
bc
r
)
=
∂
(
Pc(pc)− bcr
)
∂pt
|p∗c . (69)
Last notice that equation 68) and 69) are identical because
∂
(
Pc(pc)− bcr
)
∂pc
=
∂
(
Pc(pc)− bcr
)
∂pt
|p∗c .
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Appendix 3
We solve here for the unique function, s(pt), satisfying:
rC(pt) = s(pt) +
d
d4Et(Ct+4) |4=0,
which, by Ito’s Lemma, can be rewritten as
rC(pt) = s(pt) + µptC
′(pt) +
σ2
2
pt
2C ′′(pt).
i) When pt ∈ [p, p∗c), by some easy algebra one can find that C, C ′ and C ′′ are equal to
C = αξcV + (1− αξc)γ
C ′ = αξc
[
1
r − µ + λ
(
γ − p
r − µ
)
pt
λ−1
pλ
]
C ′′ = αξcλ(λ− 1)
(
γ − p
r − µ
)
pt
λ−2
pλ
.
By substituting in the last equation for C, C ′ and C ′′, one obtains
r
{
αξc
[
pt
r − µ +
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
pt
p
)λ]
+ (1− αξc)γ
}
= s(pt) + µptαξc
[
1
r − µ + λ
(
γ − p
r − µ
)
pt
λ−1
pλ
]
+
+
σ2
2
pt
2αξcλ(λ− 1)
(
γ − p
r − µ
)
pt
λ−2
pλ
,
which can be simplified as
r
{
αξc
[
pt
r − µ +
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
pt
p
)λ]
+ (1− αξc)γ
}
= s(pt) + µαξc
[
pt
r − µ + λ
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
pt
p
)λ]
+
+
σ2
2
αξcλ(λ− 1)
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
pt
p
)λ
.
Using, for brevity, the notation
A =
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
pt
p
)λ
the previous equation can be rearranged as follows[
r − µλ− σ
2
2
λ(λ− 1)
]
αξcA+ r
(
αξc
pt
r − µ + (1− αξc)γ
)
= s(pt) + µαξc
pt
r − µ,
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which simplifies into
r
(
αξc
pt
r − µ + (1− αξc)γ
)
= s(pt) + µαξc
pt
r − µ,
because λ is the negative root of the quadratic equation
r − µλ− σ
2
2
λ(λ− 1) = 0.
Therefore, solving for s(pt) yields
sc(pt) = αξcpt + (1− αξc)rγ for pt ∈ [p, p∗c).
ii) When pt ∈ [p∗c ,∞) one can find that s(pt) = bc as shown below. Using the notation:
B =
(
P(p∗c)−
bc
r
)
,
the term C, C ′ and C ′′ can be written as
C =
bc
r
+B
(
pt
p∗c
)λ
C ′ = λB
pλ−1t
p∗cλ
C ′ = λ(λ− 1)Bp
λ−2
t
p∗cλ
,
which substituted for into the differential equation rC = s+ µpC ′ + σ
2
2
p2C ′′, give
r
[
bc
r
+B
(
pt
p∗c
)λ]
= s(pt) + µptλB
pλ−1t
p∗cλ
+
σ2
2
pt
2λ(λ− 1)Bp
λ−2
t
p∗cλ
,
which rearranges as [
r − µλ− σ
2
2
λ(λ− 1)
]
B
(
pt
p∗c
)λ
+ bc = s(pt)
bc = s(pt).
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Appendix 4
The equity holders’ plan belongs to the set Pj = {Pe, Pj, Ps : Pe ≥ Pe, Pj ≥ Pj, Ps < Ps}.
Therefore
Pe ≥ Pe,
can be rearranged (by adding and subtracting V ) into
V − Pe − (V − Pe) ≥ 0.
Replacing V − Pe and V − Pe with Pj + Ps and Pj + Ps gives
Pj + Ps − Pj − Ps ≥ 0.
As Pj = J and Ps = S the above rewrites as
Pj + Ps − J − S ≥ 0,
which is the definition of the arbitrage payoff, Π, therefore one concludes
Π = Pj + Ps − J − S ≥ 0.
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Appendix 5
Under the two strategies, {p∗j1, p∗s2} and {p∗j2, p∗s1}, Hypotheses 2) holds.
In fact, if the optimal strategy is {p∗j1, p∗s2}, one can easily prove that
Fs > Ps(p
∗
s2) ≥ VL(p∗s2)
by following the same steps as in Appendix 1 (just replace the subscript ‘c’, in Appendix
1, with the subscript ‘s’).
If instead the optimal strategy is {p∗j2, p∗s1}, again it is quite straightforward to prove
that Hypotheses 2 holds, that is
Fs > VL(p
∗
s1).
By substituting for VL(p
∗
s1), the above inequality rearranges as
Fs > α
[
p∗s1
r − µ +
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
p∗s1
p
)λ]
+ (1− α)γ
Fs > α
[
λ
λ− 1
Fs + Fj − γ(1− αξs,j)
αξs,j
+
(
γ − p
r − µ
)(
p∗s1
p
)λ]
+ (1− α)γ
Fs − γ(1− α)
α
>
λ
λ− 1
Fs + Fj − γ(1− αξs,j)
αξs,j
− γ
λ− 1
(
p∗s1
p
)λ
. (71)
One can notice that the left hand side of 71 is such that
Fs − γ(1− α)
α
>
Fs + Fj − γ(1− αξs,j)
αξs,j
, (72)
which can be proved as follows. Rearrange 72 as shown below
Fsαξs,j − γ(1− α)αξs,j > (Fs + Fj)α− γ(1− αξs,j)α
Fs[(ξj + ξs)(1−) + α]− γ(1− α)[(ξj + ξs)(1−) + α] > (Fs + Fj)α− γα
Fs − γ
Fj
>
α
(ξs + ξj)(1− α) , (73)
and notice that 73 holds because under the strategy {p∗j2, p∗s1}, the second condition in 36
must hold, which, in turn, can be rewritten as
Fs − γ
Fj
>
ξs(1− α) + α
ξj(1− α) ,
where one can easily notice that the right hand side is such that
ξs(1− α) + α
ξj(1− α) >
α
(ξs + ξj)(1− α) ,
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which proves therefore 73 and in turn 72.
We can use the result from 72 in 71, which can then be rearranged as follows
Fs − γ(1− α)
α
>
Fs + Fj − γ(1− αξs,j)
αξs,j
>
λ
λ− 1
Fs + Fj − γ(1− αξs,j)
αξs,j
− γ
λ− 1
(
p∗s1
p
)λ
,
=
λ
λ− 1
Fs + Fj − γ(1− αξs,j)
αξs,j
− γ
λ− 1
(
Fs + Fj − γ(1− αξs,j)
γαξs,j
)λ
.
Last it can be proved that the above inequality holds, that is
Fs + Fj − γ(1− αξs,j)
αξs,j
>
λ
λ− 1
Fs + Fj − γ(1− αξs,j)
αξs,j
− γ
λ− 1
(
Fs + Fj − γ(1− αξs,j)
γαξs,j
)λ
,
by following the same calculation as in Appendix 1 (simply replace the term αξc in Ap-
pendix 1 with αξs,j and the term Fc with Fs + Fj).
44
Appendix 6
We show here that
sj(pt) =
{
bj for p
∗
j1 < pt
αξs,jpt + (1− αξs,j)γr − ss(pt) for pt ≤ p∗j1
ss(pt) =
{
bs for p
∗
s2 < pt
αξspt + (1− αξs)γr for pt ≤ p∗s2
As argued in Appendix 3, we know that the claim value, S(pt) and J(pt) are free of
arbitrage opportunity if the following equation holds:
rS(pt) = ss(pt) + µptS
′(pt) +
σ2
2
pt
2S ′′(pt),
rJ(pt) = sj(pt) + µptJ
′(pt) +
σ2
2
pt
2J ′′(pt).
i) For pt ≤ p∗s2, the function ss(pt) can be found by following the same calculation as
in Appendix 3, point i), just replace αξc with αξs , which yields
ss(pt) = αξspt + (1− αξs)rγ for pt ∈ [p, p∗s2).
With regard to the function sj(pt), using for brevity the notation
A = γ − p
r − µ,
one can find that the terms J , J ′ and J ′′ are equal to
J = P j = ξj(1− α)(V − γ)
J ′ = ξj(1− α)
(
1
r − µ + λA
pt
λ−1
pλ
)
J ′′ = ξj(1− α)λ(λ− 1)Apt
λ−2
pλ
.
Substituting these terms in the above differential equation yields
rξj(1− α)
[
pt
r − µ + A
(
pt
p
)λ
− γ
]
=
sj(pt) + µptξj(1− α)
(
1
r − µ + λA
pt
λ−1
pλ
)
+
σ2
2
pt
2ξj(1− α)λ(λ− 1)Apt
λ−2
pλ
,
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which rearranges as
rξj(1− α)
[
pt
r − µ + A
(
pt
p
)λ
− γ
]
=
sj(pt) + µξj(1− α)
[
pt
r − µ + λA
(
pt
p
)λ]
+
σ2
2
ξj(1− α)λ(λ− 1)A
(
pt
p
)λ
,
ξj(1− α)A
(
pt
p
)λ [
r − µλ− σ
2
2
λ(λ− 1)
]
+ rξj(1− α)
(
pt
r − µ − γ
)
=
sj(pt) + µξj(1− α) pt
r − µ,
rξj(1− α)
(
pt
r − µ − γ
)
= sj(pt) + µξj(1− α) pt
r − µ,
sj(pt) = ξj(1− α)(pt − rγ).
By simple algebra, sj(pt) can also be rewritten as
sj(pt) = αξs,jpt + (1− αξs,j)γr − ss(pt).
ii) For pt ∈ (p∗s2, p∗j1], the function ss(pt) can be simply worked out by following the same
calculation in Appendix 3, point ii) (the only change is the trigger p∗s2 instead of p
∗
c).
Therefore the same result holds, that is
ss(pt) = bs.
In the remainder we will use, for convenience, the following notation:
A = γ − p
r − µ,
B = αξsV (p
∗
s2) + (1− αξs)γ −
bs
r
.
With regard to the function sj(pt), first rearrange J as follows
J(pt) = P j + P s − S(pt)
= (ξs + ξj)(V − VL) + VL − bs
r
−
(
ξs(V (p
∗
s2)− VL(p∗s2)) + VL(p∗s2)−
bs
r
)(
pt
p∗s2
)λ
= αξs,jV + (1− αξs,j)γ −
bs
r
−B
(
pt
p∗s2
)λ
= αξs,j
[
pt
r − µ + A
(
pt
p
)λ]
+ (1− αξs,j)γ −
bs
r
−B
(
pt
p∗s2
)λ
.
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Then, one can work out J ′ and J ′′ as follows
J ′ = αξs,j
(
1
r − µ + λA
pλ−1t
pλ
)
− λBp
λ−1
t
p∗s2
λ
J ′′ = αξs,jλ(λ− 1)A
pλ−2t
pλ
− λ(λ− 1)Bp
λ−2
t
p∗s2
λ
.
Substituting for J , J ′ and J ′′ in the corresponding differential equation yields
r
{
αξs,j
[
pt
r − µ + A
(
pt
p
)λ]
+ (1− αξs,j)γ −
bs
r
−B
(
pt
p∗s2
)λ}
=
= sj(pt) + µpt
[
αξs,j
(
1
r − µ + λA
pλ−1t
pλ
)
− λBp
λ−1
t
p∗s2
λ
]
+
+
σ2
2
pt
2
[
αξs,jλ(λ− 1)A
pλ−2t
pλ
− λ(λ− 1)Bp
λ−2
t
p∗s2
λ
]
,
which simplifies as follows:
r
{
αξs,j
[
pt
r − µ + A
(
pt
p
)λ]
+ (1− αξs,j)γ −
bs
r
−B
(
pt
p∗s2
)λ}
=
= sj(pt) + µ
[
αξs,j
(
pt
r − µ + λA
(
pt
p
)λ)
− λB
(
pt
p
)λ]
+
+
σ2
2
[
αξs,jλ(λ− 1)A
(
pt
p
)λ
− λ(λ− 1)B
(
pt
p
)λ]
,
[
αξs,jA
(
pt
p
)λ
−B
(
pt
p∗s2
)λ] [
r − µλ− σ
2
2
λ(λ− 1)
]
+
+r
[
αξs,j
pt
r − µ + (1− αξs,j)γ −
bs
r
]
= sj(pt) + µαξs,j
pt
r − µ,
r
[
αξs,j
pt
r − µ + (1− αξs,j)γ −
bs
r
]
= sj(pt) + µαξs,j
pt
r − µ,
αξs,jpt + (1− αξs,j)γr − bs = sj(pt).
iii) For pt ∈ (p∗j1,∞), the function ss(pt) = bs remains unchanged and by working a
similar calculation as in Appendix 3, point ii), it is easy to obtain the result sj(pt) = bj.
Just replace the term bc/r with bj/r and the term P c(p
∗
c) with P j(p
∗
j1)+P s(p
∗
j1)−S(p∗j1).
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Appendix 7
Most of the results of this appendix can be derived and Appendix 6, therefore we will
provide only the main guideline of the proof where possible. In this appendix we prove
that
ss(pt) =
{
bs for p
∗
s1 < pt
αξs,jpt + (1− αξs,j)γr − sj(pt) for pt ≤ p∗s1
sj(pt) =
{
bj for p
∗
j2 < pt
ξj(1− α)(pt − γr) for pt ≤ p∗j2
i) When pt ≤ p∗j2 the functions ss(pt) and sj(pt) can be worked out following the same
calculation in Appendix 6, point i).
ii) When pt ∈ (p∗j2, p∗s2], the function sj(pt) can be simply worked out by following the
same calculation in Appendix 3, point ii) (the only change is the trigger p∗j2 instead of
p∗c). Therefore the same result holds, that is
sj(pt) = bj.
As already done in Appendix 6, in the remainder we will use, for convenience, the following
notation:
A = γ − p
r − µ,
B = ξj(1− α)(V (p∗j2)− γ)−
bj
r
.
With regard to the function sj(pt), first rearrange S as follows
S(pt) = P j + P s − J(pt),
= (ξs + ξj)(V − VL) + VL − bj
r
−
(
ξj(V (p
∗
j2)− VL(p∗j2))−
bj
r
)(
pt
p∗j2
)λ
,
= αξs,jV + (1− αξs,j)γ −
bj
r
−B
(
pt
p∗j2
)λ
,
= αξs,j
[
pt
r − µ + A
(
pt
p
)λ]
+ (1− αξs,j)γ −
bj
r
−B
(
pt
p∗j2
)λ
.
Notice that this last equation has been already found in Appendix 6, point ii) when
rearranging J , the only difference if that the trigger p∗s2 is replaced now by p
∗
j2 and the
constant term B is differently defined (but this does not affect the result as the term B,
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in Appendix 6, point ii) cancels out). We can therefore use the result previously found
for the function sj(pt) and just invert the subscript j with s. This leads to
αξs,jpt + (1− αξs,j)γr − bj = ss(pt).
iii) For pt ∈ (p∗s1,∞), the function sj(pt) = bj remains unchanged and by working a
similar calculation as in Appendix 3, point ii), it is easy to obtain the result ss(pt) = bs.
Just replace the term bc/r with bs/r and the term P c(p
∗
c) with P j(p
∗
s1)+P s(p
∗
s1)−S(p∗s1).
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Appendix 8
Notice first that the sign of ĈSs − CSj is positive iff the numerator is positive, that is
(bs/r − γ)
bj/r
>
(S − γ)
J
.
Notice that regardless of the optimal stopping strategy, for low enough level of the state
variable the equity holders impair both creditors jointly. Therefore, when joint renegoti-
ation occurs, i.e. when pt ∈ [p, p∗i2], we know that the value of the junior and senior debt
is given by
J = Pj = ξj(V − VL)
S = Ps = ξs(V − VL) + VL.
Substituting for the debt values, Pj and Ps, when pt ∈ [p, p∗i2], the above inequality
rearranges as follows
Pj(bs − γ) > (Ps − γ)bj/rξj(V − VL)(bs − γ) > (ξs(V − VL) + VL − γ)bj/r
ξj(1− α)(V − γ)(bs − γ) > [ξs(1− α)(V − γ) + α(V − γ)]bj/r
ξj(1− α)(bs − γ) > [ξs(1− α) + α]bj/r
ξj(1− α)(bs − γ) > αξsbj/r.
Now, by replacing bs/r with F − bj/r, this last inequality can be easily rearranged as
bj
r
αξs,j
ξj(1− α) < F − γ.
We have already found this inequality in comparing p∗i2 and p¯ and we know that it holds
iff the optimal stopping strategy is {p∗j2, p¯}. The reverse inequality holds instead iff the
optimal stopping strategy is {p∗s2, p¯}. Therefore we can conclude that
for pt ∈ [p, p∗i2]
{
ĈSs − CSj > 0 iff (bs/r−γ)bj/r >
(S−γ)
J
iff {p∗j2, p¯}
ĈSs − CSj < 0 iff (bs/r−γ)bj/r <
(S−γ)
J
iff {p∗s2, p¯}
(74)
So far we have proved that when the stopping strategy is {p∗j2, p¯}, for pt ∈ [p, p∗j2],
ĈSs − CSj > 0 and the reverse inequality holds when the strategy is {p∗s2, p¯} and
pt ∈ [p, p∗s2]. What is left to prove is that the sign of the spread doesn’t revert for
the remaining ranges of the state variable, that is for pt ∈ (p∗i2, p¯] (we prove this in point
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i))and pt ∈ (p¯,∞) (see point ii))).
i) We prove here that the sign of ĈSs − CSj does not revert when pt ∈ (p∗i2, p¯]. In
order to do this let us compare our firm with an identical one, say firm A, which only
differs for allocation of bargaining power in between creditors, that is:
ξs + ξj = ξAs + ξAj, with ξj 6= ξAj,
where the subscript A denotes the creditors’ bargaining powers of firm A.
Particularly, assume that in firm A creditors’ bargaining power is allocated such that:
ξAj :
αξs,j
ξAj
=
F − γ
bj/r
,
which implies that the optimal stopping strategy is to impair both creditors at p¯.
Furthermore, let us assume that the bargaining power of creditors in our firm is allo-
cated such that the optimal stopping strategy is instead {p∗j2, p¯} which, therefore, implies
ξj :
αξs,j
ξj
<
F − γ
bj/r
.
First notice that because the sum of creditors’ bargaining power in the two firms is the
same, the term αξs,j is the same for both firms. Therefore, putting together these last two
assumptions it follows that
ξj > ξAj.
Moreover, from the two above assumptions on {ξAj, ξAs} and {ξj, ξs} and our previous
result in the first part of this Appendix, it follows that
for pt ∈ [p, p¯]→ bs/r − γ
bj
=
PAs − γ
PAj
(75)
for pt ∈ [p, p∗j2]→
bs/r − γ
bj
>
Ps − γ
Pj
, (76)
where PAs and PAj correspond to the functions Ps and Pj with bargaining powers ξAs
and ξAj respectively.
Given this scenario it is easy to see that the sign of the spread does not revert. By
some straightforward algebra one can prove that
for pt ∈ (p∗j2, p¯]→
PAs − γ
PAj
=
bs/r − γ
bj
>
S − γ
J
,
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where J and S are the debt values in our firm with bargaining power {ξj, ξs}. In fact,
this last inequality holds if
PAs − γ
PAj
>
S − γ
J
,
which can be rearranged as
PAs − γ
PAj
+ 1 >
S − γ
J
+ 1,
PAs + PAj − γ
PAj
>
S + J − γ
J
. (77)
As we assumed that ξs + ξj = ξAs + ξAj, it follows that
PAs + PAj = Ps + Pj
and moreover we know that the equilibrium values J and S are such that
Ps + Pj = S + J.
By these two conditions, equation 77) simplifies into
J > PAj,
which holds because the only difference between J and PAj is due to the fact that ξj 6= ξAj
and particularly, as previously shown, ξj > ξAj.
Therefore we conclude that when the stopping strategy is {p∗j2, p¯}
for pt ∈ (p∗j2, p¯] ĈSs − CSj > 0 iff
(bs/r − γ)
bj/r
>
(S − γ)
J
.
By comparing this result with the previous one, in the first part of the proof, one can
conclude that the sign of the spread does not revert over the whole range [p, p¯].
When the optimal stopping strategy is {p∗s2, p¯}, one can repeat symmetrically the
above argument. Just compare a firm, which has a stopping strategy {p∗s2, p¯}, with the
same benchmark firm A. The relation between bargaining powers will be reversed now,
i.e. ξj < ξAj. The rest of the proof runs symmetrically, and can be easily done by just
reverting the sign of the inequalities. We can conclude then that when {p∗s2, p¯}
for pt ∈ (p∗s2, p¯] ĈSs − CSj < 0 iff
(bs/r − γ)
bj/r
<
(S − γ)
J
.
Again, by comparing this result with the one in the previous part, one can conclude that
the sign of the spread does not revert on the range [p, p¯].
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ii) From some straightforward algebra it is immediate to see that the sign of the spread
cannot change when pt ∈ (p¯,∞). We know that the sign of the spread is determined by
the following inequality
(bs/r − γ)
bj/r
T (S − γ)
J
.
When the stopping strategy is {p∗j2, p¯}, substituting for the values S and J and rearranging
yields [
bj
r
+
(
P j(p
∗
j2)−
bj
r
)(
pt
p∗j2
)λ](
bs
r
− γ
)
T[
bs
r
+
(
P s(p¯) + P j(p¯)− J(p¯)−
bs
r
)(
pt
p¯
)λ
− γ
]
bj
r
,(
P j(p
∗
j2)−
bj
r
)(
pt
p∗j2
)λ
T
(
P s(p¯) + P j(p¯)− J(p¯)−
bs
r
)(
pt
p¯
)λ
,(
P j(p
∗
j2)−
bj
r
)
p¯λ T
(
P s(p¯) + P j(p¯)− J(p¯)−
bs
r
)
p∗j2
λ,
which is independent of pt. Adding to this result the fact that the difference of the spread
is continuous at pt = p¯, we conclude that ĈSs − CSj cannot revert sign in the range
pt ∈ (p¯,∞).
We reach the same conclusion when the stopping strategy is {p∗s2, p¯}, by a similar
calculation one can easily prove that the sign of the spread is independent of the state
variable.
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Table A 
Classification of Claims and Voting Solicitations under Chapter 11: Examples of 
Confirmed Plans. 
 
 
Company name  Description of Claims  Classes  Impairment Entitlement to vote  Voting 
solicitation: 
acceptance of 
plan 
Secured Claims  1 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
Priority Non-Tax 
Claims   
2 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
General Unsecured 
Claims (Class 1 
Deficiency Claims .) 
3  Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) 
 
- 
· Bondholder Claims 
(Senior Notels)  
· Bank Claims  
4  Impaired Yes 
 
Yes 
Junior Subordinated 
Debentures Claims  
5 Impaired Yes 
 
Yes 
Securities Law Claims  6 Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
Ordinary Shares 7 Impaired Yes Yes 
Petroleum Geo-
Services ASA. 
Other Equity Interests  8 Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
Administrative Claims  1 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
Priority Tax Claims  2 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
Other priority Tax 
Claims  
3 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
Prepetition Lender 
Claims  
4 Impaired Yes Yes 
Nonconsensual Lien 
Claims  
5 Impaired Yes Yes 
6A Unimpaired 
 
No (deemed to accept) - Secured Claims  
6B Impaired Yes Yes 
General Unsecured 
Claims  
7 Impaired Yes Yes 
Intercompany Claims   8 Impaired No (deemed to accept) - 
360 Networks Ltd. 
Interests   9 Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
Priority Non-Tax 
Claims  
A Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
B1, B3, 
B4, B6-
B17 
Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - Other Secured  
Claims  
B2, B5 Impaired Yes Yes 
US Health Care 
Program 
C Impaired Yes Yes 
Senior Lender Claims  D Impaired Yes Yes 
General Unsecured E1 Impaired Yes Yes 
Convenience Claims  E2 Impaired Yes Yes 
Senior Subordinated 
Note Claims  
F Impaired Yes Yes 
Sun Healthcare Group 
Inc. 
Convertible 
Subordinated Debenture 
Claims  
G Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
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Table A (cont.) 
 
 
Company name  Description of Claims  Classes  Impairment Entitlement to vote  Voting 
solicitation: 
acceptance of 
plan 
C-TIPS Claims 
(Convertible Junior 
Subordinated 
Debenture ) 
H Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
Subsidiary Debtor 
Intercompany Claims  
I Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
Security Litigation 
Claims  
J Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
Sun Healthcare Group 
Inc. 
Equity Interests K Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
Secured Claims  
 
1 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
Priority Claims  2 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
General Unsecured 
Claims  
3 Impaired Yes Yes 
Subordinated Claims  4 Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
National Energy & Gas 
Transmission, Inc. 
Interests  5 Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
Priority Non-Tax 
Claims  
1 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
Prepetition  Secured 
Guarantee Claims  
2 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
Other Secured Claims  
-No claims in this class- 
3 (Potentially 
impaired) 
- - 
TWC Assigned Claims 
(Senior Notes) 
4 Impaired Yes Yes 
Senior Redeemable 
Note Claims  
5 Impaired Yes Yes 
Other Unsecured 
Claims  
6 Impaired Yes Yes 
Subordinated Claims  7 Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
WCG Equity Interests  8 Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
Williams 
Telecommunication 
Group, Inc. and CG 
Austria, Inc.  
CG Austria Equity 
Interests  
9 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
Vero Electronics Inc. 
and APW Ltd. 
Priority Non-Tax 
Claims  
1 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
 Senior Secured Credit 
Facilities 
2 Impaired Yes Yes 
 Other Secured Claims  3 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
 Lease Guarantee Claims 4 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
5A Impaired Yes Yes  General Unsecured 
Claims (include Class 2 
Deficiency claims) 5B Impaired Yes Yes 
 Intercompany Claims  6 Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
 Securities Litigation 
Claims  
7 Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
8A Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
8B Unimpaired No (deemed to accept) - 
 Equity Interests 
8C Impaired No (deemed to reject) - 
 
Data from Chapter 11 Plans and Confirmation Orders provided by the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts of the following districts: 
Southern District of New York, District of Delaware, District of Maryland.  
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FIGURE 1: Restructured debt value with one single creditor 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Senior and junior debt values when ps<pj 
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FIGURE 3: Senior and junior debt values when ps=pj 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4: Senior and junior debt values when ps>pj 
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FIGURE 5: Senior and junior debt service when ps<pj 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6: Senior and junior debt service when ps=pj 
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FIGURE 7: Senior and junior debt service when ps>pj 
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FIGURE 8: Credit Spreads and Renegotiation Premium 
 
 
Parameter values . The credit spreads and renegotiation premia (right and left column plots respectively) 
to the senior and the junior creditors (black and red lines respectively) are calculated according to the 
following parameters: ex =0.3, a =0.2, m =0.03, s =0.15, r=0.08, g =200, F=600, Fs = 400 and Fj = 200. 
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FIGURE 9: Senior under-secured/unsecured, junior Credit Spreads 
and unsecured Spread Differential 
 
 
 
 
